This article is written by Allen Hicken, professor at the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan and Nico Ravanilla, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego.

Clientelism — the targeting of money, goods, and favours to influence voters — is common in many poor countries.

This can slow development because it encourages politicians to appeal to voters with self-interest rather than the common good in mind. It can also undermine democratic consolidation (i.e. the development of ideology-based political parties, free and fair elections, etc.); and allows a small group of political elites to entrench their power.

For several years we have been conducting a series of studies on clientelism in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Philippines. In this article, we discuss some common myths associated with practices like vote buying (giving handouts of money or goods to voters with the expectation that they will reciprocate with a vote) and contrast those myths with what we have found through our research. If you want to read more about our research and other findings we have also included a list of additional reading at the end.

Myth #1: Clientelism is a product of, and sustained by, cultures of gift-giving and reciprocity.

A common assumption in discussions of clientelist practices like vote buying is that it is a product of culture-driven and sustained by traditions of gift-giving and strong norms of reciprocity.

For example, descriptions of vote buying in the Philippines by scholars and politicians often refer to the cultural norm of a “debt of gratitude” (utang na loob) as an important factor driving the practice.

The belief is that when voters receive a gift of money from a candidate or their representative cultural norms of will induce the voter to reciprocate with their vote. Our research suggests that while such attitudes are often present in clientelist environments, they are neither necessary nor sufficient to sustain clientelism. In interviews with candidates and campaign workers in the Philippines and Indonesia, for example, we find that most candidates don’t believe that such norms of reciprocity are enough to keep voters loyal.

In our interviews with candidates and campaign workers in Indonesia and the Philippines every interviewee we asked, out of a sample of several hundred, reported that the main priority when it comes to distributing electoral handouts is core supporters

Despite such norms, they worry a lot about voters defecting (either not voting, or voting for the other side). And when we survey voters and ask them about the consequences of taking money and not voting or voting for the other side, very few express an expectation that there will be any negative consequences, including feelings of shame.

In addition, recent work in the Philippines demonstrates that while campaign workers are often able to identify which voters are most likely to feel an intrinsic obligation to reciprocate an offer of money with their vote, targeting such voters is rarely plan A. Instead, they prefer to target voters who are central in local social networks, regardless of whether those voters are like possess a strong norm of reciprocity. These socially central voters are prime targets of vote buying because campaign workers are effectively able to monitor and enforce vote buying by tapping into voters' social networks to learn about their behaviour at the polls.

Myth #2: Vote buying and other types of electoral handouts are considered morally and ethically problematic.

In some political contexts, activities like vote buying carry a serious moral and social stigma. Parties and candidates go to great lengths to hide the practice, and voters are reluctant to admit accepting money or goods in exchange for their votes.

However, our work in the Philippines and Indonesia reveals that these kinds of activities, while illegal, are none-the-less ubiquitous and generally do not carry any serious moral or social disapproval among the general public. Candidates and campaign workers freely describe the details of their vote buying strategies and activities, while voters feel little shame in admitting to accepting electoral handouts.

This is perhaps one reason why anti-vote buying campaigns that emphasise moral and ethical concerns have generally made little headway.

Myth #3: The primary purpose of giving electoral handouts is to convince undecided voters to support a candidate.

One standard account of vote buying views the practice as a means of winning over voters who would otherwise not vote for the candidate. But in most developing democracies electoral handouts seem to be less about persuasion, and more about mobilising core supporters, preventing their defection, and signalling one’s viability as a candidate.

Popular anti-vote-selling campaigns like the ones that make voters promise to "take the bait, but not the hook" can, ironically, increase vote-selling

In our interviews with candidates and campaign workers in Indonesia and the Philippines every interviewee we asked, out of a sample of several hundred, reported that the main priority when it comes to distributing electoral handouts is core supporters. Elections are a chance for a candidate to show loyal supporters, in a material way, that the candidate is viable, and that he or she values their support.

The hope is that such handouts will induce supporters to stay loyal and turn out in support.

Myth #4: Anti-vote buying campaigns are effective tools for combatting vote buying

One common technique for combating vote buying is for election administrative agencies or NGOs to organise anti-vote buying campaigns.

Two different approaches are popular — 1) encouraging voters to refuse offers of money, or 2) encouraging voters to take the money but then vote their conscience. Although both approaches are widely employed, there is no clear consensus on which is more effective.

We recently tested the efficacy of such appeals via an experiment in the Philippines. We found that inviting voters to promise to “vote your conscience” despite accepting money is significantly less effective. Indeed, we found that it led voters to change their vote from their most preferred candidate to the candidate that offered a handout.

This finding helps explain why popular anti-vote-selling campaigns like the ones that make voters promise to "take the bait, but not the hook" can ironically increase vote-selling. At the time that voters accept vote buying money, they don't think it will influence their vote. However, when they get to the polls, they find it much harder to resist being reciprocal to the vote buying candidate, so they end up "selling" their votes instead.

On the other hand, we found that asking voters to promise "not to take any money from candidates'' — did reduce vote-selling. By making a hard promise to not accept any money, voters are able to fight the temptation to vote-sell from the get-go. That said, while we found that having voters pledge to refuse offers of money did reduce the incidence of vote buying and boost the chance that voters would vote sincerely, it is only true when the amounts being offered by candidates were relatively low.

For high stakes races (e.g. races for mayor or governor), where the amounts being offered are higher, encouraging voters to turn down offers had no effect. — Allen Hicken and Nico Ravanilla

Further reading:

(Picture credit: Unsplash)