NATO's reactionary defence policy must change to one of diplomacy and deterrence

This post is written by Frank V. Zerunyan, J.D. LL.D. (hc) and Victorino G. Mercado, (RADM-US Navy-Retired).

• The problem: The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exposed NATO’s incapacity to deter.
• Why it matters: NATO's relevance as an effective deterrent is vital to preventing other authoritarian leaders from following Putin’s path.
• The solution: Evaluate NATO’s position of reactionary defence to one that is agile enough to deter in the 21st century.

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all …"
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 (Treaty).

For more than 70 years, those words have been the guiding principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine and NATO's inability to preempt the conflict or stop the bloodshed underscore that they are not enough.

Russia's incursion into the sovereign territory of Ukraine and its bombardment of civilians and targets, including just a few kilometres from the border of NATO territory, has exposed the organisation's incapacity to deter. It doesn't have to be that way.

If applied effectively, NATO possesses the tools to have made President Putin pause in his decision to invade Ukraine. NATO must use this time of crisis for self-reflection on how it needs to change to be more relevant and effective in the future.

Addressing deterrence as well as defence

The governance structure of NATO is driven by consensus among the 30 members – of the Alliance. When NATO announces a decision, it expresses the will of all countries in the Alliance. This process sometimes makes it difficult to arrive at a unified conclusion. Recently, President Erdogan of Turkey, an authoritarian head of state in NATO, demonstrated the difficulty of cohesion by putting his nationalistic and political self-interest before the interest of the Alliance.

The preamble of the Treaty states that all members "seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." All members "are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security."

But there is no provision in the 14 articles of the Treaty to address deterrence. In the 21st century's global economy, with all the technological advancements in weaponry, promoting "stability and well-being" and "the preservation of peace and security" may not be accomplished without NATO adapting its processes to enable deterrent activities requiring bold and swift action.

If applied effectively, NATO possesses the tools to have made President Putin pause in his decision to invade Ukraine.

The humanitarian crisis in the Alliance with three million-plus refugees and counting is hardly "stability," "well-being," or "security". NATO needs a policy to deter this behaviour from a rogue country leader willing to violate international law, norms, and the most basic human rights.

To transition NATO from an organisation that relies on a reactionary concept like Article 5, which calls for the collective defence of NATO members, to one that is agile enough to deter in the 21st century effectively requires significant policy and procedural reform.

The need for change

The percolation of Russian aggression towards Ukraine and the lack of deterrent relationship-based soft diplomatic and harsher diplomatic policy such as pre-packaged sanctions, trade barriers, banking policy, etc., highlight the need for change on the diplomatic front. NATO members must be more committed internally as well as externally. The internal authoritarian members should not be able to dictate policy to the Alliance, nor should the external rogue leader be able to take NATO for granted.

To implement change, NATO must work harder to achieve a pre-consensus environment on multiple vital fronts. This change starts with a shared understanding of the threat perceived by the frontline states and geopolitical realities in Europe and the world.

NATO's relevance as an effective deterrent will be questionable if it does not act to renew its role based on its mission and values.

This unique understanding will enable more details, options, and granularity in deterrence planning. With improved detailed planning driven by rigorous policy debate, compromise, and consensus, NATO must place increased trust in and empower the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to implement the plans. The power to implement deterrence measures is critical to NATO's ultimate success in delivering its mission.

Lastly, NATO must accelerate the entire establishment of the NATO Cyber Operations Center with appropriate authorities to account for, shape, and, if possible, prevent conflict.

The conflict’s conclusion will influence others

How the conflict in Ukraine concludes, Russia's projected economic standing, military force posture, and political outlook will determine the time and degree that NATO needs to reshape itself to achieve the agility required to prevent further Russian or any other country's adventurism. How the conflict in east Ukraine concludes will have a great deal of influence on authoritarians like Presidents Aliyev and Erdogan. They made their territorial ambitions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Northern Syria, Cyprus, and Kurdistan quite clear. If NATO and the West commit the same mistakes and do not deter these authoritarians, more bloodshed is likely in the caucuses, the Mediterranean, and the middle east.

From a military standpoint, policymakers must roll up their sleeves to complete the detailed prerequisite consensus work to allow the SACEUR the minimum level of decentralised execution authority required. This policy, reached in consensus, will allow NATO commanders in all domains to seize the narrative and initiate countermeasures to resolve a deteriorating situation in a manner favourable to NATO and deter any potential Article 5 trigger.

Yielding even a minimal level of control by sovereign states to a single military leader is not trivial. It would require more detailed vetting of the leader and establishing agreed boundaries in time, actions, and geography. But NATO must ultimately empower its military capabilities to act in times of extreme crises within defined policy boundaries and appropriate accountability.

Considering our recent experience, NATO's relevance as an effective deterrent will be questionable if it does not act to renew its role based on its mission and values.

Frank V. Zerunyan is a Professor of the Practice of Governance at the University of Southern California (USC) Sol Price School of Public Policy (USC Price) and Director of Executive Education Forum for Local and Military Leaders. Zerunyan also oversees USC's Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) as the Director and University Liaison for the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Naval Reserves ROTC and USC Nautical Science Programs.

Victorino G. Mercado, RADM USN (ret.) is a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans & Policy and has held various senior military positions overseeing strategic plans and policy development and implementation.

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