How to reset the executive-legislative relationship

_This article is written by Luna Viana, a Brazilian Federal Government civil servant. _

• The problem: The government transition process can be tricky.
• Why it matters: A vicious or difficult executive-legislative relationship can create a situation of deadlock or high governability costs.
• The solution: Conduct a government transition process where the executive pivots the relationship.

Brazil is under a significant political transition. But it has been a difficult one: the outgoing government is unwilling to cooperate for a soft political power transition.

But how can you manage such a tricky transition? The incoming political leader has a long list of challenges. It must manage the risks of attacks by the losers and those who have consolidated themselves as opposition. Also, it is needed to deal with internal disputes, as the prospect of taking power causes internal groups to fight to take the largest number of positions in government.

Troubleshooting 101

The political transition process critical path also redefines the relationship between the executive and the legislative. New governments must take advantage of the heat of the election and the support of the polls to “pivot” the terms of negotiation: that is, to place negotiation prices as low as possible, to value the instruments they have to obtain support (which could have been devalued during the declining administration of the outgoing government).

Drawing on the perspective that the executive has a toolbox to manage relationships with the legislature and the fact that these tools have devalued during the last government, the newly elected government could pursue:

• Definition of the organisational structure of the new government (ministries and secretariats), distributing strategic programmes and budgets among them but keeping some more “strategic” than others. In this way, these most valued ministries or secretariats serve as “political sponsorship quotas”.
• Drastically reduce the need to release resources to obtain voting support in the first 100 days. One could establish early in the political transition process the package of measures that will be sent to Congress on January 1st, with a ceremony involving the political leaders of the groups that are committing to the new government.
• Change the terms of negotiation with Congress, reinstating, definitively, the terms of negotiation bequeathed by the last government. This is anchored in the heat of the results of the polls. This is not the case of Brazil recent polls, where electoral results only deepened societal division.

When the election results reflect a divided country, and there is no “heat of the polls”, it becomes more challenging to change the negotiation terms. Resorting to a programmatic base that unites society can be an instrument to have a public opinion as an ally in the negotiation process.

What to do next

The government needs to establish from the beginning a strategy to deal with the legislative house. That ought to include strategies for managing the support base (so that it remains in support), for managing the “centre”, and for managing the opposition. An organisational unit for managing relations with parliamentarians must be well-structured with leadership and a team with skills in negotiation and institutional articulation.

Resorting to a programmatic base that unites society can be an instrument to have a public opinion as an ally in the negotiation process.

One way to deal with a large support base, in which divergent groups vie for positions of power, is to expand the priority agenda. This means valuing agendas and organisational units for what they are or could become in the new government. It is interesting to think about mechanisms of “checks and balances” between these groups, but with final power for the groups that hold the proposals or the greater legitimacy to prevail. These mechanisms would distribute organisational units and agendas to groups with opposing views so that they stop and value the representative’s power as the final word. They follow strategies to deal with animosity and risks for the new management. A potential strategy for managing the support base is to involve them in programme discussions, keeping them busy discussing the formatting of programmes with the ministerial teams and integrating them in trips and inaugurations.

The “centre” has no ideological orientation and is oriented towards where there is a greater possibility of political gains and financial resources. It is the group that, in the same proportion in which it is possible to manage support, it is also possible that opposition to political strategies of weakening the government to increase the terms of negotiation (becoming more expensive to obtain support), to meet the moods of the media and the population. A possible strategy is to involve interest-based partners with local agendas, openings, events, and leadership in agendas of interest to the government. It also leaves them busy and, in a way, divided so that they do not articulate strategies to reduce the power of the new government.

How to handle the opposition

Considering the “opposition”, as it is said, it's important to keep your enemies close so you know what they're up to. Managing polarity with the opposition is important because it keeps support from the voter base alive. However, the level of tension must be calibrated with the number of seats or the ability to block opposition agendas in the Legislative House or access and power over the judiciary and audit courts. Having opposition is important to keep the public debate alive, but the government should never be a hostage but rather a mediator or conductor of the process.

The dilemma between sending a package of legislative measures at the beginning of the government or slicing the reforms has different proposals for approach. A government that is elected with a significant majority has the legitimacy and strength to send a package of measures. As for a government that came out of an almost divided electoral process, the strategy must be different. Otherwise, all the good ideas of the government can be burned in the first 100 days. In this case, it is probably better not to send major reforms at the beginning. Putting the agenda to a societal discussion, especially administrative, labour, and tax reforms, might help strengthen them inside an unfriendly Congress. In the first 100 days, quick-win proposals should be based on showing that the government, even coming from a divided election, has the power to define the cards on the table. From the moment that legitimacy grows, at the end of the first year, the reforms can be forwarded, defined from a posture of “mediator” of the government and not “hostage” of a need to propose reforms. Crises will arise, and from them, the opportunists on duty will try to put the government against the wall if it becomes hostage to society's demand for reforms.

In the first 100 days, quick-win proposals should be based on showing that the government, even coming from a divided election, has the power to define the cards on the table.

How the new government pivots its relationship with Congress in the first days of government must be a strategy that gains consistency from the first day of the announcement of the electoral results. Inviting congressional members for the inauguration day and defining who is in the picture and is inside the political agenda are other tools that put the executive in a more consistent position when there is a historical past of savage pork barrel relationships.

Note: The author would like to thank Frederico de Morais Andrade Coutinho for the comments on the extended Portuguese version.

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